We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2x2 game is selected by the model as well...

This statement outlines the objectives and policies of the new journal, Macroeconomic Dynamics, which is dedicated to the advancement of macroeconomics as a science. This Editorial is to appear at the front of the first issue of that journal and is copyright by Cambridge University Press.

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for...

We formulate a dynamic learning-and-adjustment model of a market in which sellers choose signals that potentitally reveal their types. If the dynamic process selects a unique limiting outcome, then that outcome must be an undefeated equilibrium; though to be undefeated does not suffice to be the...

We examine an evolutionary model in which the primary source of "noise" that moves the model between equilibria is not random, arbitrarily improbable mutations but mistakes in learning. We find conditions under which the payoff-dominant equilibrium in a 2 x 2 game is selected by the model as...

The determinants of money velocity are explored under various assumptions on interest rate uncertainty in a monetary general equilibrium model. It is found that the appearance of velocity function instability can be produced by overlooking interest rate stochastic volatility. In addition, when...