The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by existing models in economics, artificial intelligence and game theory. New models are needed to deal with these multi-agent interactions. In this paper we present a new model--distributed games. In such a model each players...

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large...

The model of a non-Bayesian agent who faces a repeated game with incomplete informationagainst Nature is an appropriate tool for modeling general agent- environment interactions. In such a modelthe environment state (controlled by Nature) may change arbitrarily and the reward function is...

A learning process is belief affirming if for each player, the difference between her expected payoff in the next period, and the average of her past payoffs converges to zero. We show that every smooth discrete fictitious play and every continuous fictitious play is belief affirming. We also...

In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played. Typically, information structures that determine different signals, induce different equilibrium payoffs.In zero-sum games the equilibrium payoff...

In a sequential decision problem at any stage a decision maker, based on the history, takes a decision and receives a payoff which depends also on the realized state of nature. A strategy, f, is said to be as good as an alternative strategy g at a sequence of states, if in the long run f does,...

The model of a cooperative fuzzy game is interpreted as both a population game and a cooperative investment game. Three types of core- like solutions induced by these interpretations are introduced and investigated. The interpretation of a game as a population game allows us to define sub-games....

Aumann(1976) has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event E if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event E, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for E *do*...

Upon observing a signal, a Bayesian decision maker updates her probability distribution over the state space, chooses an action, and receives a payoff that depends on the state and the action taken. An information structure determines the set of possible signals and the probability of each...

A new integral for capacities, different from the Choquet integral, is introduced and characterized. The main feature of the new integral is concavity, which might be interpreted as uncertainty aversion. The integral is then extended to fuzzy capacities, which assign subjective expected values...