Showing 1 - 10 of 110
Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062347
The problem of coordination failure, particularly in 'team production' situations, is central to a large number of mircroeconomic as well as macroeconomic models. As this type of inefficient coordination poses a severe economic problem, there is a need for institutions that foster efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352
We study whether "coercive" public provision or voluntary private provision of public goods can survive when individuals who "vote with their feet" can choose between communities that differ in the way that public goods are provided. We obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium always...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407605
This paper proves an equilibrium selection result for a class of games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a general class of binary action, N-player games, we prove that each such game has a unique equilibrium strategy profile. Using a global game approach first introduced by Carlsson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407607
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to a group of agents. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides the good to the group, only if the sum of their bids exceeds a reserve...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118539
We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders. On one hand, the pooling of information within bidding rings increases the precision of competing estimates. We demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407619
In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889
This paper considers a dynamic model of Tiebout-like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods. At issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time. We model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550873