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Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

information. This way we are able to investigate (i) the coordination abilities of the subjects depending on the underlying game …, (ii) the resulting efficiency loss, and (iii) the adjustment of the learning rule. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575

Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This … asymmetric continuation paths. The multiplicity of possible conventions gives rise to a coordination problem at a higher level if … the game is one of pure coordination. However, if there is a slight conflict of interest between players, a unique optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - EconWPA - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407524

Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 1998

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407530

Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information

Bigelow, John Payne - EconWPA - 1996

Two refinements, called value oriented equilibria, of the Nash equilibrium concept are proposed for repeated games of complete information. Value sufficient equilibria make each player's strategic response to the another player's previous actions depend only on the value of those actions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407532

Some Notes on Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Berger, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2004

Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407536

Design, Analysis and Simulation of the Progressive Second Price Auction for Network Bandwidth Sharing

Lazar, Aurel; Semret, Nemo - EconWPA - 1998

efficiency and signalling load. Finally, we provide a rate-distortion theoretic basis for valuation of bandwidth, which leads …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407539

False Reputation in a Society of Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Kalai, Ehud - EconWPA - 1997

Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541

Loss Aversion in Repeated Games

Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1998

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for strategic form games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference dependent utility functions (in which utility is determined not only by an outcome, but also by the relationship of the outcome to a reference point) are a better...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407553