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We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609
In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889
simultaneously, announcing any positions they choose on any issues. To us, salience is simply the discussion of an issue in a … campaign. If both candidates and voters are expected utility maximizers, we find salience results, in that candidates typically …-Schmeidler to illustrate how robust nonsalience and salience of issues might be generated. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118536
game of mutual fate control, while earlier psychologists' experiments show some tendency to convergence. Our rivalling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062347
rather classical economic institution: competition. In a series of laboratory experiments, we reveal that the true reason for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352
Fictitious play is the classical myopic learning process, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class of games including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond dominance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407536
Exploiting small uncertainties on the part of opponents, players in long, finitely repeated games can maintain false reputations that lead to a large variety of equilibrium outcomes. Even cooperation in a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma is obtainable. Can such false reputations be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407541
Earlier experiments have shown that under little information subjects are hardly able to coordinate even though there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407575
According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407613