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Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W. - EconWPA - 2005

We examine a simple economic model of network formation where agents benefit from indirect relationships. We show that small-world features - -- short path lengths between nodes together with highly clustered link structures --- necessarily emerge for a wide set of parameters.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407573

Search in the Formation of Large Networks: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?

Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W. - EconWPA - 2005

features that have been found to characterize large socially generated networks. Moreover, we derive the distribution of degree … lower tail may exhibit substantial curvature, just as in observed networks. We then fit the model to data from six networks …. Besides offering a close fit of these diverse networks, the model allows us to impute the relative importance of search versus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062339

Allocation Rules for Network Games

Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2003

alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550861

A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency

Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2003

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550866

Asynchronous Evolution of Pairs - How spatial evolution leads to inequality

Kirchkamp, Oliver - EconWPA - 1995

We present a simple model of spatial evolution that avoids several problems that arise with more complex networks of … captured while nonlinearities that would arise with more complex networks are avoided. We can identify characteristics of … evolution in networks such as stable cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games and long run exploitation among different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118522

Congestion Games Revisited

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. - EconWPA - 2004

Strategic games are considered where the players derive their utilities from participation in certain 'processes.' Two subclasses consisting exclusively of potential games are singled out. In the first, players choose where to participate, but there is a unique way of participation, the same for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550874

On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games

Carmona, Guilherme - EconWPA - 2003

We consider Salim Rashid's asymptotic version of David Schmeidler's theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players' payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid's theorem to hold. That is, a bound on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550924

On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games

Carmona, Guilherme - EconWPA - 2004

We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an epsilon - pure, epsilon -...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550926

Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players

Carmona, Guilherme - EconWPA - 2003

We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an $\varepsilon_n$-equilibria, with $\varepsilon_n$ converging to zero. In our characterization, the sequence of finite games...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118535

On the existence of Nash equilibrium in electoral competition

Saporiti, Alejandro - EconWPA - 2005

This paper generalizes previous existence results on unidimensional electoral competition, by extending the traditional two-party electoral game to the case where parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in the policy implemented...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118547