We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of...

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model...

An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In...

It is now almost a common truth that society needs to avoid environment contamination or damage become significant for nature protection programs of the government and wild life preservation efforts. A possible outcome of such efforts might occasionally be a voluntary solution, which results...

The stochastic evolutionary game literature is built on three behavioral postulates: ``noisy'' decisionmaking, myopic decisionmaking and random opportunities for choice (inertia). The role of noise is by now well- understood. This paper investigates the significance of the other two postulates....

Cooperative and noncooperative games have no representation of players's basis utilities. Basis utility is the natural reference point on a player's utility scale that enables the determination the marginal utility of any payoff or allocation. A player's basis utility can be determined by an...

In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

This article reports not only theoretical solution of bargaining problem as used by game theoreticians but also an adequate calculus. By adequate calculus we understand an algorithm that can lead us to the result within reasonable timetable using either the computing power of nowadays computers...

The model of 2 x 2 coordination games in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (Econometrica 1993) is extended to allow for a mutation rate that is stochastic over time. The expected time the system spends in the risk dominated equilibrium is systematically underestimated by the standard model in Kandori,...