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Lost in Translation? Basis Utility and Proportionality in Games

Feldman, Barry - EconWPA - 2005

Cooperative and noncooperative games have no representation of players's basis utilities. Basis utility is the natural reference point on a player's utility scale that enables the determination the marginal utility of any payoff or allocation. A player's basis utility can be determined by an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407599

The Core of a Normal Form Game

Kóczy, László Á. - EconWPA - 2003

Due to the externalities, in normal form games a deviation changes the payoff of all players inducing a retaliation by the remaining or residual players. The stability of an outcome depends on the expectations potential deviators have about this reaction, but so far no satisfactory theory has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118659

Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes

Friedman, Daniel; Singh, Nirvikar - EconWPA - 2004

A preference for negative reciprocity is an important part of the human emotional repertoire. We model its role in … sustaining cooperative behavior but highlight an intrinsic free-rider problem: the fitness benefits of negative reciprocity are … reciprocity is a meme consisting of a group norm together with low-powered (and low-cost) group enforcement of the norm. The main …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550868

The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations

Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Joerg - EconWPA - 1995

Experimental results on the ultimatum game show clearly that (1) large fractions of players offer a 'fair' allocation and (2) that unfair (but positive) offers are systematically rejected. We offer an explanation of this behavior using the 'indirect evolutionary approach' which is based on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407564

Metabolism of Social System: N-Person Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Analysis In Random Boolean Network

Situngkir, Hokky; Khanafiah, Deni - EconWPA - 2004

Random Boolean Network has been used to find out regulation patterns of genes in organism. This approach is very interesting to use in a game such as N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here we assume that agent’s action is influenced by input in the form of choices of cooperate or defect she...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062379

An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players

Safra, Zvi; Samet, Dov - EconWPA - 2003

Shapley proved the existence of an ordinal, symmetric and efficient solution for three-player bargaining problems. Ordinality refers to the covariance of the solution with respect to order-preserving transformations of utilities. The construction of this solution is based on a special feature of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550955

Preference Evolution and Reciprocity

Sethi, Rajiv; Somanathan, E. - EconWPA - 1999

This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550958

Cooperation and Punishment

Thomas, Jonathan P.; Evans, Robert - EconWPA - 2000

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513

The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - EconWPA - 2001

For each outcome (i.e.~a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407594

The Core Can Be Accessed in a Bounded Number of Steps

Kóczy, László Á. - EconWPA - 2002

This paper strengthens the result of Sengupta and Sengupta (1996). We show that for the class of games with nonempty cores the core can be reached in a bounded number of proposals and counterproposals. Our result is more general than this: the boundedness holds for any two imputations with an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407616