We study option management by committee. Analysis is illustrated by tenure decisions. Our innovations are two-fold: we treat the committee's problem as one of social choice, not of information aggregation; and we endogenise the outside option: rejecting a candidate at either the probationary or...

We study whether "coercive" public provision or voluntary private provision of public goods can survive when individuals who "vote with their feet" can choose between communities that differ in the way that public goods are provided. We obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium always...

We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which...

According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any...

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the preface, in which I explain my choice of items to include.

I am putting together a collection of clippings, journal articles, and original material to accompany my game theory book. It is due at the publisher's September 1, 1999. This is the table of contents.

We present the Progressive Second Price auction, a new decentralized mechanism for allocation of variable-size shares of a resource among multiple users. Unlike most mechanisms in the economics litterature, PSP is designed with a very small message space, making it suitable for real-time market...

In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. First, if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal's offer; the dominant-strategy implementation...

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model...