Similar Search Results

Search in the Formation of Large Networks: How Random are Socially Generated Networks?

Jackson, Matthew O.; Rogers, Brian W. - EconWPA - 2005

We present a model of network formation where entering nodes find other nodes to link to both completely at random and through search of the neighborhoods of these randomly met nodes. We show that this model exhibits the full spectrum of features that have been found to characterize large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062339

A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency

Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2003

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550866

Nonspecific Networking

Durieu, Jacques; Haller, Hans; Solal, Philippe - EconWPA - 2004

A new model of strategic network formation is developed and analyzed, where an agent's investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118625

Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Riechmann, Thomas; Weimann, Joachim - EconWPA - 2004

The problem of coordination failure, particularly in 'team production' situations, is central to a large number of mircroeconomic as well as macroeconomic models. As this type of inefficient coordination poses a severe economic problem, there is a need for institutions that foster efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352

"A Tiebout Theory of Public vs Private Provision of Collective Goods"

Lagunoff, Roger; Glomm, Gerhard - EconWPA - 1997

obtain the following findings: (i) an equilibrium always exists in which all individuals to the community which uses … voluntary provision; (ii) under very robust conditions on preferences and income distribution, an equilibrium exists in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407605

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Substitutes

Harrison, Rodrigo J. - EconWPA - 2003

This paper proves an equilibrium selection result for a class of games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a … general class of binary action, N-player games, we prove that each such game has a unique equilibrium strategy profile. Using …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407607

Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods

Alboth, Dirk; Lerner, Anat; Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1997

equilibrium bidding functions for the agents, and find the optimal reserve price for the auctioneer when such functions are used … by the bidders. We also examine another interesting family of equilibrium bidding functions for this case, with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118539

Loss Aversion Equilibrium

Shalev, Jonathan - EconWPA - 1997

The Nash equilibrium solution concept for games is based on the assumption of expected utility maximization. Reference … two types of loss-aversion equilibrium, a solution concept endogenizing reference points. The two types reflect different … types of updating of reference points during the game. In equilibrium, reference points emerge as expressions of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407600

Preferences, Choices, and Satisfaction in a Bargaining Game

Amborino, Angela; Lanteri, Alessandro; Novarese, Marco - EconWPA - 2005

The first aim of this contribution is to study the role of cheap talk in the determination of a focal point in a bargaining game. A general discussion was therefore conducted before the bargaining, followed by a poll in which players must find a common solution to an abstract bargaining problem....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118521

Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental

Arévalo, Julián; Ojeda, Jair - EconWPA - 2004

This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118595