Similar Search Results

Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2001

Reinforcement learning has proved quite successful in predicting subjects' adjustment behaviour in repeatedly played simple games. However, reinforcement learning does not predict convergence to the efficient cell in the minimal information game of mutual fate control, while earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407543

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Duersch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - EconWPA - 2005

We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407609

Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices

Riechmann, Thomas - EconWPA - 2005

This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062347

Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game

Riechmann, Thomas; Weimann, Joachim - EconWPA - 2004

The problem of coordination failure, particularly in 'team production' situations, is central to a large number of mircroeconomic as well as macroeconomic models. As this type of inefficient coordination poses a severe economic problem, there is a need for institutions that foster efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062352

Salience: Agenda Choices by Competing Candidates

Berliant, Marcus; Konishi, Hideo - EconWPA - 2004

simultaneously, announcing any positions they choose on any issues. To us, salience is simply the discussion of an issue in a … campaign. If both candidates and voters are expected utility maximizers, we find salience results, in that candidates typically …-Schmeidler to illustrate how robust nonsalience and salience of issues might be generated. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118536

Joint Bidding in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence

Mares, Vlad; Shor, Mikhael - EconWPA - 2003

We examine theoretically and experimentally two countervailing effects of collusion and symmetric mergers among bidders. On one hand, the pooling of information within bidding rings increases the precision of competing estimates. We demonstrate that, in average value auctions, this leads to more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407619

An Experiment on the Value of Structural Information in a 2x2 Repeated Game

Mitropoulos, Atanasios - EconWPA - 2002

In experimental studies pairs that repeatedly play the simple coordination game mutual fate control may regularly fail to coordinate when they are given little in-formation, i.e. when subjects are uninformed about the payoff matrix and feed-back is limited to their own payoff. Our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889

Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, … - EconWPA - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407524

Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - EconWPA - 1998

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407530

Value Oriented Equilibria in Repeated Games of Complete Information

Bigelow, John Payne - EconWPA - 1996

Two refinements, called value oriented equilibria, of the Nash equilibrium concept are proposed for repeated games of complete information. Value sufficient equilibria make each player's strategic response to the another player's previous actions depend only on the value of those actions to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407532