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This paper offers a noncooperative behaviourally-founded solution of the complete information bargaining problem where two impatient individuals wish to divide a unit pie. We formulate the game in continuous time, with unrestricted timing and content of offers. Reprising experimental work from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550878
We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118549
This note gives explicit formulas for the non-expected utility Nash- as well as the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550936
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407524
We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407526
We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407545
An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley (1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407563
It is now almost a common truth that society needs to avoid environment contamination or damage become significant for nature protection programs of the government and wild life preservation efforts. A possible outcome of such efforts might occasionally be a voluntary solution, which results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407567
The stochastic evolutionary game literature is built on three behavioral postulates: ``noisy'' decisionmaking, myopic decisionmaking and random opportunities for choice (inertia). The role of noise is by now well- understood. This paper investigates the significance of the other two postulates....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407595
Cooperative and noncooperative games have no representation of players's basis utilities. Basis utility is the natural reference point on a player's utility scale that enables the determination the marginal utility of any payoff or allocation. A player's basis utility can be determined by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407599