Showing 1 - 10 of 174
We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other … contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equlibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338
This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124853
We analyze different ways of pairing agents in a bipartite matching problem, with regard to its scaling properties and to the distribution of individual ``satisfactions''. Then we explore the role of partial information and bounded rationality in a generalized {\it Marriage Problem}, comparing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062392
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407524
bargaining is the unique solution satisfying efficiency, symmetry, affine transformation invariance and monotonicity in pure … bargaining games with basis utility. Characterization of the Nash (1950) bargaining solution requires the assumption of the … proportional bargaining based on Gul (1988). Further noncooperative application is demonstrated by showing that quantal response …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407599
We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336
In this paper we characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate along with additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems. Moreover, new characterizations of the well known rules based on the principles of "equal award", "equal loss",...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062337
We introduce a new value for NTU games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using a consistency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062354
-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062374
A typical assumption of the standard alternating-offers model under risk is that the breakdown event means a complete and irrevocable halt in negotiations. We reinterpret the meaning of breakdown as the imposition to finish negotiations immediately. Specifically, after breakdown the last offer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550921