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Inherited Institutions : Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy
Langenbach, Pascal - 2019
impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902398
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Institutional Endogeneity and Third-Party Punishment in Social Dilemmas
Marcin, Isabel - 2019
situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903425
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Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships
Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16
We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248
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Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods
Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328
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Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule
Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22
joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity … voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a … choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301
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To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game
Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28
In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197
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Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers
Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730
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Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment
Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus - 2010
Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199338
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Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities
Engel, Christoph - 2014
We study the effect of voting when insiders' public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting …. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative … externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044538
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Abuse of Power – An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment
Hoeft, Leonard - 2017
We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012948887