Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as 'given.' A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading to...

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading...

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their 'relative responsibility for the harm caused' according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley value...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley...

In two-person generosity games, the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and...

In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our...