We use an agent-based model to investigate the interdependent dynamics between individual agency and emergent socioeconomic structure, leading to institutional change in a generic way. Our model simulates the emergence and exit of institutional units, understood as generic governed social...

In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural trait. This rewiring...

This paper addresses the role of affect and emotions in shaping the behavior of responders in the ultimatum game. A huge amount of research shows that players do not behave in an economically rational way in the ultimatum game, and emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible...

Recently, the emergent dynamics in multiplex networks, composed of layers of multiple networks, has been discussed extensively in network sciences. However, little is still known about whether and how the evolution of strategy for selecting a layer to participate in can contribute to the...

We discuss the strategy that rational agents can use to maximize their expected long-term payoff in the co-action minority game. We argue that the agents will try to get into a cyclic state, where each of the (2N+1) agents wins exactly N times in any continuous stretch of (2N+1) days. We propose...

Revision game is a very recent advance in dynamic game theory and it can be used to analyze the trading in the pre-opening stock market. In such games, players prepare actions that will be implemented at a given deadline, before which they may have opportunities to revise actions. For the first...

We present an agent-based model of manipulating prices in financial markets through spoofing: submitting spurious orders to mislead traders who learn from the order book. Our model captures a complex market environment for a single security, whose common value is given by a dynamic fundamental...

Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such “linkage” has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the...

Cooperation is a fundamental aspect of well-organized societies and public good games are a useful metaphor for modeling cooperative behavior in the presence of strong incentives to free ride. Usually, social agents interact to play a public good game through network structures. Here, we use...

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) have been used to solve several optimization problems in control systems. MAS allow understanding the interactions between agents and the complexity of the system, thus generating functional models that are closer to reality. However, these approaches assume that...