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Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players’ shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550537

Asymmetric reimbursement and contingent fees in environmental conflicts : observable vs. unobservable contracts

Park, Sung-Hoon; Settle, Chad E. - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-9

specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i …) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts …; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341

A Nobel Prize for property rights theory

Holden, Richard T. - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011620749

Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests

Dickson, Alex; Mackenzie, Ian A.; Sekeris, Petros - In: Games 13 (2022) 6, pp. 1-11

We investigate observed rent dissipation-the ratio of the total costs of rent seeking to the monetary value of the rent-in winner-take-all and share contests, where preferences are more general than usually assumed in the literature. With concave valuation of the rent, we find that contests can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418203

Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests : the case of telephony

Faria, João Ricardo; Mixon, Franklin G.; Caudill, Steven B. - In: Games 5 (2014) 2, pp. 116-126

Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each other and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010417142

Assortative matching by lottery contests

Cohen, Chen; Rabi, Ishay; Sela, Aner - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-20

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418053

Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players

Sahm, Marco - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-6

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner's expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172435

Payoff shares in two-player contests

Häfner, Samuel; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Games 7 (2016) 3, pp. 1-7

In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709893

The optimality of team contracts

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825

Noncontractible investments and reference points

Hart, Oliver D. - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 437-456

contract renegotiation, an optimum can be achieved by giving the seller the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. However …, with shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit the seller’s offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785337