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This article studies a leader-follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the interior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422501
This paper derives a dynamic path of ongoing terror attacks as a function of terrorists' capacity and a target government's counterterror capacity. The analysis provides several novel insights and characterizations. First, the effect of counterterror policy is limited. Second, proactive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503799
Market power in water markets can be modeled as simultaneous quantity competition on a river structure and analyzed by applying social equilibrium. In an example of a duopoly water market, we argue that the lack of backward induction logic implies that the upstream supplier foregoes profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426327
advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a …, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum … as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171901
produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable … counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group …-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171770
A game-theoretic model of repeated interaction between two potential adversaries is analyzed to illustrate how conflict … players. During each period, each adversary must decide to either stage an attack or not. Conflict ensues if either player … period of tranquility. When this happens, it is as if conflict has suddenly arisen without any apparent cause or impetus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167897
Effective sharing mechanisms of joint costs among beneficiaries of a project are a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the project. Projects that are heterogeneous both in terms of the landscape of the area under development or the participants (users) lead to a more complicated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515643
on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching … an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to … investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785364
-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the … resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120
We study three triggers of conflict and explore their resultant emotional reactions in a laboratory experiment …. Economists suggest that the primary trigger of conflict is monetary incentives. Social psychologists suggest that conflicts are … that conflict originates from all three triggers. The three triggers differently impact the frequency of conflict, but not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011708841