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Vertical relationships with hidden interactions

Kim, Jaesoo; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-21

In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443301

The optimality of team contracts

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 670-689

This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240825

Asymmetric reimbursement and contingent fees in environmental conflicts : observable vs. unobservable contracts

Park, Sung-Hoon; Settle, Chad E. - In: Games 14 (2023) 4, pp. 1-9

) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts … the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two … specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341

The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent

Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22

This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217

Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology

Marini, Marco; Polidori, Paolo; Teobaldelli, Désirée; … - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/6, pp. 1-13

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk aversion. In this paper, we show that this relationship may be absent or reversed when the technology is endogenous and projects with a higher efficiency are also riskier. Using a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848346

Countervailing conflicts of interest in delegation games

Chiba, Saori; Leong, Kaiwen - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-20

the context of principal-agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest-pandering incentives related …, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443303

Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences : wich team to choose?

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-24

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771132

Optimal incentives schemes under homo moralis preferences

Sarkisian, Roberto - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/28, pp. 1-22

output realizations. Furthermore, I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting, in which a contract is initially offered to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493322

Contract and game theory : basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 457-496

This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In … the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual … relationship. In particular, the model shows the importance of accounting for the self-enforced component of contract in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785335

Incentive systems for risky investment decisions under unknown preferences : Ortner et al. revisited

Schosser, Josef - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/26, pp. 1-4

Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849522