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Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks

Gilles, Robert Paul; Mallozzi, Lina - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-19

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable … utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players-constituting a … hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426676

Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R. - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-16

We propose a dynamic model of decentralized many-to-one matching in the context of a competitive labor market. Through wage offers and wage demands, firms compete over workers and workers compete over jobs. Firms make hire-and-fire decisions dependent on the wages of their own workers and on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453256

From bargaining solutions to claims rules : a proportional approach

Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel; Osório, António; … - In: Games 6 (2015) 1, pp. 32-38

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503395

The integer nucleolus of directed simple games : a characterization and an algorithm

Wolff, Reiner - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-12

We study the class of directed simple games, assuming that only integer solutions are admitted; i.e., the players share a resource that comes in discrete units. We show that the integer nucleolus-if nonempty-of such a game is composed of the images of a particular payoff vector under all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621467

Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions

Staudacher, Jochen; Wagner, Felix; Filipp, Jan - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-17

We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of players (reflecting, e.g., ideological proximity) using the paradigm of dynamic programming. Starting from the state-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171847

Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks

Juarez, Ruben; Wu, Michael - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/17, pp. 1-18

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The … total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062098

Economic harmony : a rational theory of fairness and cooperation in strategic interactions

Suleiman, Ramzi - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-21

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252726

On the three-person game baccara banque

Ethier, Stewart N.; Lee, Jiyeon - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 57-78

Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by 0 E 2 (0; 1). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316668

Partial cooperative equilibria : existence and characterization

Béal, Sylvain; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Ghintran, Amandine; … - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 338-356

provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751965

The price of anarchy for network formation in an adversary model

Kliemann, Lasse - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 302-332

We study network formation with n players and link cost α > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752420