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Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents

Do, Anne-Ly; Rudolf, Lars; Gross, Thilo - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 30-40

In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653074

The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis

Chmura, Thorsten; Güth, Werner - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 333-354

the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293459

Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Network Good Production

Knigge, Antonie; Buskens, Vincent - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 357-380

collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding … together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful … collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682975

Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

Andersson, Ola; Holm, Hakan J. - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 497-507

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010690512

What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games

López-Pérez, Raúl; Vorsatz, Marc - In: Games 3 (2012) 2, pp. 78-96

The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030499

Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions

Ernst, Christiane; Thöni, Christian - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 608-623

We report results from experimental first-price, sealed-bid, all-pay auctions for a good with a common and known value. We observe bidding strategies in groups of two and three bidders and under two extreme information conditions. As predicted by the Nash equilibrium, subjects use mixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030504

Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294862

The Influence of Priming on Reference States

Matthey, Astrid - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 34-52

outcomes of either the individual herself or her reference group. The experiment described in this paper suggests that, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682983

Equity <em>versus</em> Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; … - In: Games 1 (2010) 2, pp. 89-102

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008682986

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 299-317

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316535