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Imitation and local interactions: Long run equilibrium selection
Vicario, Eugenio - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-19
In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200092
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Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature
Weidenholzer, Simon - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 551-585
local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756384
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Coordination games and local interactions : a survey of the game theoretic literature
Weidenholzer, Simon - In: Games 1 (2010) 4, pp. 551-585
local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and … best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752447
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Imitation and local interactions : long run equilibrium selection
Vicario, Eugenio - In: Games 12 (2021) 2/30, pp. 1-19
In this paper, we analyze the long run dynamics of a multi-agent game played on a one-dimensional lattice with periodic boundary conditions, i.e., a ring. Agents repeatedly play a 2 × 2 coordination game with neighbors where the payoff dominant action and the risk dominant action are distinct....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012493331
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An adaptive learning model in coordination games
Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369376
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Investigating peer and sorting effects within an adaptive multiplex network model
Lipari, Francesca; Stella, Massimo; Antonioni, Alberto - In: Games 10 (2019) 2, pp. 1-12
multiplex network who deal with coordination issues using social learning and payoff-driven dynamics. Agents form their … heterogeneous preference through learning on one layer and they play a pure coordination game on the other layer. People learn from …. We find that the presence of the social learning mechanism explains the rising and the endurance of a segregated society …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227761
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An Adaptive Learning Model in Coordination Games
Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711826
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An adaptive learning model in coordination games
Funai, Naoki - In: Games 4 (2013) 4, pp. 648-669
In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player assigns subjective payoff assessments to his own actions, where the assessment of each action is a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240826
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Investigating peer and sorting effects within an adaptive multiplex network model
Lipari, Francesca; Stella, Massimo; Antonioni, Alberto - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/16, pp. 1-12
multiplex network who deal with coordination issues using social learning and payoff-driven dynamics. Agents form their … heterogeneous preference through learning on one layer and they play a pure coordination game on the other layer. People learn from …. We find that the presence of the social learning mechanism explains the rising and the endurance of a segregated society …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062102
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Local interaction on random graphs
Berninghaus, Siegfried; Haller, Hans - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 262-285
We analyze dynamic local interaction in population games where the local interaction structure (modeled as a graph) can change over time: A stochastic process generates a random sequence of graphs. This contrasts with models where the initial interaction structure (represented by a deterministic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369390