Similar Search Results

The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so that noncontractibility of renegotiation amounts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681054

The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785372

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

Give and let give : alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions

Grech, Philip D. - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/21, pp. 1-11

We propose a new family of mechanisms, whereby players may give more or less directly to one another. A cornerstone case is the regular linear public goods mechanism (LPGM), where all contribute into a single common group account, the total amount of which is then distributed equally among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061924

Playing a game or making a decision? : methodological issues in the measurement of distributional preferences

Greiff, Matthias; Ackermann, Kurt A.; Murphy, Ryan O. - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/80, pp. 1-25

In terms of role assignment and informational characteristics, different contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and systemically vary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011993280

Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior

Pfister, Hans-Rüdiger; Böhm, Gisela - In: Games 3 (2012) 1, pp. 1-29

emotional mechanisms have been proposed as a possible explanation. In particular, feelings of fairness, anger and envy are … driven by feelings of envy towards a third party. Results from two experiments suggest that responders experience feelings of … towards the proposer. Responders also experience dissatisfaction and envy when third party shares exceed their own shares …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646375

Incomplete Information about Social Preferences Explains Equal Division and Delay in Bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603731

When efficiency requires arbitrary discrimination : theoretical and experimental analysis of equilibrium selection

Güth, Werner; Otsubo, Hironori - In: Games 14 (2023) 5, pp. 1-15

Institutions may rely on fundamental principles, e.g., of legal philosophy, but may also have evolved according to institutional fitness, as gauged by a society's well-being. In our stylized framework where two fundamental principles, equality and efficiency, conflict with each other, one of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426703

Spite and reciprocity in auctions

Nishimura, Naoko; Cason, Timothy N.; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; … - In: Games 2 (2011) 3, pp. 365-411

The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752417

The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation

Brennan, James R.; Watson, Joel - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 347-366

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369410