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An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Jandoc, Karl Robert L.; Juarez, Ruben - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/31, pp. 1-32

agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We … by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062323

A Note on the Core of TU-cooperative Games with Multiple Membership Externalities

Nax, Heinrich H. - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 191-203

A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281–298) is proposed to allow for multiple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030505

Equilibrium coalition structures in three-player symmetric games

Shen, Jingyi; Qu, Chen - In: Games 16 (2025) 3, pp. 1-15

In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two … solutions: 𝐧∗, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games … equilibrium coalition structure (based on the latter notion) is never finer than 𝐧∗, and we provide a sufficient and necessary …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015433876

Collaboration and gender focality in stag hunt bargaining

Guarin, Geraldine; Babin, J. Jobu - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-7

Knowing the gender of a counterpart can be focal in the willingness to collaborate in team settings that resemble the classic coordination problem. This paper explores whether knowing a co-worker's gender affects coordination on the mutually beneficial outcome in a socially risky environment. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200101

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: Null player or not?

Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2, pp. 1-12

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as 'null players'. Luxembourg's role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852745

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC : null player or not?

Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/29, pp. 1-12

Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849529

Collaboration and gender focality in stag hunt bargaining

Guarin, Geraldine; Babin, J. Jobu - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-7

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547673

Procedurally fair co-determination with endogeneous value uncertainty : an experiment

Güth, Werner; Martin, Ludivine; Neugebauer, Tibor; … - In: Games 16 (2025) 2, pp. 1-28

We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015408229

(Un)bounded rationality in decision making and game theory: Back to square one?

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - In: Games 1 (2010) 1, pp. 53-65

Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as 'given.' A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369416

Two-dimensional effort in patent-race games and rent-seeking contests: The case of telephony

Faria, João Ricardo; Mixon, Franklin G.; Caudill, Steven B. - In: Games 5 (2014) 2, pp. 116-126

Using the political-economic history of the development of telephony during the 1870s as a backdrop, this paper studies a two-player Tullock contest that includes both research effort (R&D) and legal effort (i.e., rent-seeking effort). The two types of efforts complement each other and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709830