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Weak conditions are provided under which society's long-run distribution of wealth is independent of initial asset holdings.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709888
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515663
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709856
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709915
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200168
The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328
This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380878
In many bargaining situations, the distribution of seats or voting weights does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Maaser, Paetzel and Traub (Games and Economic Behavior, 2019) conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of such nominal power differences in the classic Baron-Ferejohn...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171871
on the table, but there is no conflict regardless of the degree of power asymmetry. Indeed, there is no delay in reaching … an agreement that incorporates the (unrealized) costs of delay and conflict. A laboratory experiment has been used to … investigate the effects of power asymmetries on conflict rates in a two-stage bargaining game that is (if necessary) followed by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785364
-group conflict, i.e., the paradox of the plenty. We also consider the potential role of governance in avoiding this paradox. In the …-stage conflict. In the next stage, each group member allocates his private endowment between working or fighting for a share of the … resource size is higher. Group conflict (income) decreases (increases) only when leaders chose the strongest resource …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120