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Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games

Drouvelis, Michalis - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 368-380

This paper reports an experiment which compares behaviour in two punishment regimes: (i) a standard public goods game with punishment in which subjects are given the opportunity to punish other group members (democratic punishment regime) and (ii) a public goods game environment where all group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380878

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability … of cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730

Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously … findings show that pledges of commitment alone can increase cooperation and welfare in committed partnerships. The introduction … partnerships fall solely on the individual choosing to break up, pledges of commitment fail to improve cooperation and welfare. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248

Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional … maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game …' updating of their contribution strategy and observe the effect on Citizen cooperation. We find that when States have unlimited …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability … of cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709858

Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward; Lovett, Denise - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 234-256

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the … leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of … conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503532

Alleviation and sanctions in social dilemma games

Drouvelis, Michalis - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 368-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709856

Dynamic contributions to a public project : the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits

Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/43, pp. 1-19

contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in …, completion benefits are shown to strongly encourage additional cooperation and project completion. Finally, projects are more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891191

Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods

Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28

The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328

Prescriptive norms and social comparisons

Michaeli, Moti; Spiro, Daniel - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/97, pp. 1-12

This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014923