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Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication

Bayindir, Esra E.; Gurdal, Mehmet Y.; Ozdogan, Ayca; … - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/18, pp. 1-22

This paper deals with the effects of different modes of communication in a costless information transmission … having two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first, sequential in the second and … one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless of the mode of communication. However, as to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431852

On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks

Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621465

Against all odds : tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups

Schlangenotto, Darius; Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, … - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/31, pp. 1-24

When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144

Information transmission and countervailing biases in organizations

Chiba, Saori - In: Games 15 (2024) 3, pp. 1-25

A decision maker (DM) must choose between two projects or decide on no project. The expected benefits of these projects are correlated. The DM seeks advice from an agent with private information about the projects' benefits. However, the agent's divergent preferences for projects and lack of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636248

Simple mediation in a cheap-talk game

Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-14

communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426261

Cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer

Jung, Jeahan; Kim, Jeong-yoo - In: Games 15 (2024) 3, pp. 1-20

We develop a model of cheap talk with transparent and monotone motives from a seller to an informed buyer. By transparent and monotone motives, we mean that the seller's preference does not depend on the state of the world and is increasing in the choice(s) of the buyer regardless of the state...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636246

Information sharing in oligopoly : sharing groups and core-periphery architectures

Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171765

Intention or request : the impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13

This paper investigates how different message structures impact communication strategy as well as sender and receiver … behavior. Specifically, we focus on comparing communication games with messages stating an intention versus a request. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600

Communication-enhancing vagueness

Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27

I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information … model showing that vague messages increase communication between boundedly rational players, especially if some senders are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782

Information disclosure through technology licensing

Mukherjee, Arijit; Bagchi, Aniruddha - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/37, pp. 1-8

We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432202