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First you get the money, then you get the power : the effect of cheating on altruism

Johnson, David B.; Rogers, Jonathan - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-21

treat the losers, using a two stage laboratory experiment run in Canada and the United Arab Emirates. In the first stage … not subjects can cheat during the competition. The results of the experiment can be summarized as follows: (1) cheating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014427192

Gender differences in the response to decision power and responsibility : framing effects in a dictator game

Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Stolley, Florian - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/28, pp. 1-16

This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849527

The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game : some experimental evidence

Chaudhuri, Ananish; Paichayontvijit, Tirnud; Sbai, Erwann - In: Games 7 (2016) 2, pp. 1-24

We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515620

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Capizzani, Mario; Mittone, Luigi; Musau, Andrew; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-20

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709209

An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions

Jandoc, Karl Robert L.; Juarez, Ruben - In: Games 10 (2019) 3/31, pp. 1-32

conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062323

Fairness preferences in a bilateral trade experiment

Ciccone, Alice; Rogeberg, Ole; Braaten, Ragnhild Haugli - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/8, pp. 1-17

Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168600

Signalling, information and consumer fraud

Martinez-Gorricho, Silvia - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/29, pp. 1-25

on the level of fraud, incidence of fraud and trade under price rigidity is examined. Consumers receive a costless but … equilibria involving fraud exist for all parameter values. Furthermore, for some parameter values, we find that -in equilibrium …- a higher precision of consumers' private information leads to higher levels of fraud and incidence of fraud, reducing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432128

Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty : an experiment

Puzon, Klarizze Anne; Willinger, Marc - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-11

Using a laboratory experiment, we behaviourally study the impact of a sudden increase in the common-pool size on within …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453120

Partner selection and the division of surplus : evidence from ultimatum and dictator experiments

Banerjee, Priyodorshi; Chakravarty, Sujoy; Ghosh, Sanmitra - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-18

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453171

Stable sampling equilibrium in common pool resource games

Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo; Mantilla, César; Sethi, Rajiv - In: Games 6 (2015) 3, pp. 299-317

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316535