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The signaling value of punishing norm-breakers and rewarding norm-followers

Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia - In: Games 9 (2018) 4/102, pp. 1-32

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. People punish norm-breakers to pass information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014968

Ransomware and reputation

Cartwright, Anna; Cartwright, Edward - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/26, pp. 1-14

through reputation. We demonstrate that there are situations in which it is optimal for the criminal to always return the … files and situations in which it is not. We argue that the ability to build reputation will depend on how victims … they need to find ways of building a good reputation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061894

An equilibrium analysis of Knaster’s fair division procedure

Van Essen, Matthew - In: Games 4 (2013) 1, pp. 21-37

In an incomplete information setting, we analyze the sealed bid auction proposed by Knaster (cf. Steinhaus (1948)). This procedure was designed to efficiently and fairly allocate multiple indivisible items when participants report their valuations truthfully. In equilibrium, players do not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009753712

The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-16

Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation … selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted …. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621316

The Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game

Whitmeyer, Mark - In: Games 8 (2017) 3, pp. 1-21

This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709265

A condorcet jury theorem for large poisson elections with multiple alternatives

Goertz, Johanna M. M. - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/2, pp. 1-12

Herein, we prove a Condorcet jury theorem (CJT) for large elections with multiple alternatives. Voters have common interests that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal about the state of nature and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168613

Voting in three-alternative committees : an experiment

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Chernomaz, Kirill - In: Games 10 (2019) 2/20, pp. 1-23

We design an experiment to test how voters vote in a small committee election with three alternatives. Voters have common preferences that depend on an unknown state of nature. Each voter receives an imprecise private signal prior to the election and then casts a vote. The alternative with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061937

Overconfidence and timing of entry

Santos-Pinto, Luis; Pires, Tiago - In: Games 11 (2020) 4/44, pp. 1-19

We analyze the impact of overconfidence on the timing of entry in markets, profits, and welfare using an extension of the quantity commitment game. Players have private information about costs, one player is overconfident, and the other one rational. We find that for slight levels of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432306

Hybrid assessment scheme based on the stern-judging rule for maintaining cooperation under indirect reciprocity

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Uchida, Satoshi - In: Games 11 (2020) 1/13, pp. 1-10

stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012167923

Repeated play of families of games by resource-constrained players

Nikandrova, Arina - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 339-346

This paper studies a repeated play of a family of games by resource-constrained players. To economize on reasoning resources, the family of games is partitioned into subsets of games which players do not distinguish. An example is constructed to show that when games are played a finite number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009785416