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Anger management : aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods

Gee, Laura K.; Lyu, Xinxin; Urry, Heather - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-28

welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate … aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621328

Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149

punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional … punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the ability to control how quickly legal rules of punishment evolve relative to … social behavior that legal punishment regulates. However, at what rate should legal rules evolve relative to society to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651

Evolution of cooperation with peer punishment under prospect theory

Uchida, Satoshi; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Okada, Isamu; … - In: Games 10 (2019) 1/11, pp. 1-18

mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has … revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment … itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015563

Commitment to cooperation and peer punishment : its evolution

Sasaki, Tatsuya; Okada, Isamu; Uchida, Satoshi; Chen, … - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 574-587

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for … both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make … punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383961

Self-governance in generalized exchange. a laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment

Kanitsar, Georg - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-16

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However …, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in … another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547824

Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock - In: Games 6 (2015) 4, pp. 394-412

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383730

Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships

Deer, Lachlan; Bayer, Ralph-C. - In: Games 7 (2016) 1, pp. 1-16

We use experimental methods to investigate whether pledges of commitment can improve cooperation in endogenously-formed partnerships facing a social dilemma. Treatments vary in terms of the individual's: (1) opportunity to commit to their partner; (2) the cost of dissolving committed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453248

To tender or not to tender? : deliberate and exogenous sunk costs in a public good game

Heine, Florian; Sefton, Martin - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/41, pp. 1-28

In an experimental study, we compare individual willingness to cooperate in a public good game after an initial team contest phase. While players in the treatment setup make a conscious decision on how much to invest in the contest, this decision is exogenously imposed on players in the control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891197

Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation : experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Funaki, Yukihiko; Li, Jiawen; Veszteg, Róbert F. - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-22

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771301

Dynamic contributions to a public project : the impact of rising marginal benefit and completion benefits

Baker, Ronald J.; Halloran, Matthew - In: Games 9 (2018) 3/43, pp. 1-19

Many public projects are funded in a dynamic manner in which contributors are able to make gradual increases in contributions and condition additional contributions on the cooperation of others. This study presents results from experiments in which subjects with an initial fixed endowment make...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891191