better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

-prices, bidders are reluctant to bid above the option price (even though the option is no longer available once an auction has started …

. Our findings reveal that project correlation leads to these biases countervailing each other, facilitating the …, our study suggests limited benefits in the context of project correlation. …

overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending … price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not …

studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple … bidders if their use does not conflict with others; this simultaneous use directly affects the efficiency of the auction. A … price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are …

Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples … sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We consider what happens if sellers can make a take it or leave it … offer to one of their linked buyers before the auction takes place and thus such a seller can choose not to participate in …