Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final...

We investigate a private value auction in which a single “entrant” on winning imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, “regular” bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price...

We explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided combinatorial auctions for a previously untested class of value profiles in which synergies arise from shared fixed costs. We find that, in many cases, a simulator that bids straightforwardly does well in predicting auction performance, but...

We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey multi-unit demand auction: Vickrey's original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic/Ausubel auctions, with and without public dropout information reported during the auction. Although implemented by a weaker solution concept, behavior...

Extensive field evidence shows individuals' decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers' decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual's utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a...