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Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study

Chernomaz, Kirill; Levin, Dan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 611-635

We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588269

On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

Lamy, Laurent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 990-999

The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement … the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573649

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 367-391

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191

Second best efficiency and the English auction

Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 496-506

We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049683

Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction

Sano, Ryuji - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 637-650

recently used in some countriesʼ spectrum license auctions. We suppose that there are two identical items, two small bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049723

Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment

Daley, Brendan; Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 104-119

We analyze an environment in which biddersʼ private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049751

Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities

Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 269-291

-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the “entrant” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality …. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049770

First-best collusion without communication

Rachmilevitch, Shiran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 224-230

I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799

Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates

Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 388-402

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that awards a limited number of unrestricted licenses to those firms that report the highest cost reductions, combined with royalty licenses to others. Firmsʼ messages are dual signals of their cost reductions: the message of those who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049835

Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values

McGee, Peter - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 312-326

Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory … auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the … item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049854