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Comparative statics of altruism and spite

Milchtaich, Igal - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 809-831

The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other playersʼ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyoneʼs actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049844

A detail-free mediator

Vida, Péter; Āzacis, Helmuts - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 101-115

We present a cheap talk extension to any two-player, finite, complete information game, and ask what correlations over actions are implementable in Nash equilibria of the extended game. In the extension, players communicate repeatedly through a detail-free mediator that has been studied in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049807

Du, Songzi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 74-87

We study a refinement of correlated equilibrium in which playersʼ actions are driven by their beliefs and higher order beliefs about the play of the game (beliefs over what other players will do, over what other players believe others will do, etc.). For any finite, complete-information game,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049823

Coordination need not be a problem

Dutta, Prajit K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 519-534

multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in the game and the “coordination problem” refers to the fact that rational equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049691

Dynamic coordination with individual learning

Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 83-101

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest … tolerant of non-simultaneous coordination. We also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049831

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 898-920

individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria, but that coordination strongly depends on the network structure. Despite … frequent coordination failures, in graphs of size N=4 equilibrium play seems easier on network architectures with high (low …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049842

The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: An experimental study

Brindisi, Francesco; Çelen, Boğaçhan; Hyndman, Kyle - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 264-281

This paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information. In the … equilibrium of a global coordination game, where players choose the timing of their decision, a player who has sufficiently high … coordination: a learning effect (early decisions reveal information) and a complementarity effect (early decisions eliminate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049850

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 269-284

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791

Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

Bavly, Gilad; Neyman, Abraham - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 71-89

Correlation of players' actions may evolve in the common course of the play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring (“online correlation”). In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that “strong” players, i.e., players whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117125

Justifiable punishments in repeated games

Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 16-28

In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117126