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Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting

Zhao, Rui R. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 964-983

Renegotiation and conflict resolution are studied in relational contracting under subjective evaluation. Renegotiation … performance levels is compressed and the contract is less extreme compared to the case without renegotiation. This effect is … stronger when the players are less patient. Second, renegotiation typically renders termination impossible; the contract relies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049679

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 269-284

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049791

How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity?

Herz, Holger; Schunk, Daniel; Zehnder, Christian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 83 (2014) C, pp. 1-23

Recent field evidence suggests a positive link between overconfidence and innovative activities. In this paper we argue that the connection between overconfidence and innovation is more complex than the previous literature suggests. In particular, we show theoretically and experimentally that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738050

Communication in bargaining over decision rights

Lim, Wooyoung - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 159-179

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906690

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

McGee, Andrew; Yang, Huanxing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 181-191

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049841

Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models

Hoffmann, Magnus; Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 168-184

We examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two-player contest. The timing of moves, determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577243

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal; Sengupta, Kunal - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 598-612

This article characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. Our central result is that the severity of holdout (i.e. inefficiency) is critically dependent on three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573655

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 17-33

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190612