In many economic settings, like spectrum and real-estate auctions, geometric figures on the plane are for sale. Each bidder bids for his desired figure, and the auctioneer has to choose a set of disjoint figures that maximizes the social welfare. In this work, we design mechanisms that are both...

While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the type space of the players and their action space, behavioral, technical or regulatory factors can severely restrict the set of actions that are actually available to players. We study single-parameter mechanism-design...

In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just...

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We...

We study multi-unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there is no deterministic auction that (1) is individually rational and...

We consider the problem of a spatially distributed market with strategic agents. A single good is traded in a set of independent markets, where shipment between markets is possible but costly. The problem has previously been studied in the non-strategic case, in which it can be analyzed and...