We consider the optimization problem of a campaign trying to win an election when facing aggregate uncertainty, where agentsʼ voting probabilities are uncertain. Even a small amount of uncertainty will in a large electorate eliminate many of counterintuitive results that arise when voting...

In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the conditional likelihood of the signalʼs outcome, given the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across...

We use an agent's strict preferences to define indifference and incompleteness relations that identify the sequences of trades that are rational to undertake. If an agent makes sequences of trades of options labeled indifferent, the agent will never be led to an inferior outcome, but trades of...

In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the likelihood of the signal's outcome, holding fixed the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across agents....

We consider the optimization problem of a campaign trying to win an election when facing aggregate uncertainty, where agents' voting probabilities are uncertain. Even a small amount of uncertainty will in a large electorate eliminate many of counterintuitive results that arise when voting...