Similar Search Results

Becchetti, Leonardo; Fiaschetti, Maurizio; Marini, Giancarlo - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 112-129

We wonder whether different game experiences are associated with significant differences in experimental behavior and, more specifically, whether expert bridge players, due to their habit of playing with partners and seldom for money, are more likely to adopt cooperative behavior than expert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117142

Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 48-59

by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906693

Admissibility and event-rationality

Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 21-40

type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER … standard belief to validated belief, we show that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049856

Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information

Samet, Dov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 79 (2013) C, pp. 192-200

Aumann (1995) showed that for games with perfect information common knowledge of substantive rationality implies … backward induction. Substantive rationality is defined in epistemic terms, that is, in terms of knowledge. We show that when … substantive rationality is defined in doxastic terms, that is, in terms of belief, then common belief of substantive rationality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662459

Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game

Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 322-338

The notions of one's social identity and group membership have recently become topics for economic theory and experiments, and recent research has shown the importance of identity in a wide array of economic environments. But predictions are unclear when there is some trade-off between one's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049776

Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Mollerstrom, Johanna - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 117-130

In an otherwise neutrally described Prisonersʼ dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049843

Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences

Buser, Thomas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 457-470

We examine whether social preferences are partially determined by biological factors. We do this by investigating whether digit ratios (2D:4D) and menstrual cycle information are correlated with choices in ultimatum, trust, public good and dictator games. Digit ratios are thought to be a proxy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588268

Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality

Bavly, Gilad; Neyman, Abraham - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 71-89

Correlation of players' actions may evolve in the common course of the play of a repeated game with perfect monitoring (“online correlation”). In this paper we study the concealment of such correlation from a boundedly rational player. We show that “strong” players, i.e., players whose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117125

Justifiable punishments in repeated games

Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 16-28

In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117126

Beliefs and actions in the trust game: Creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect

Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 298-309

In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments asks participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117133