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Ethics, welfare, and capital markets
Kanatas, George; Stefanadis, Christodoulos - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 34-49
We examine implications of a society's cultural emphasis on moral sentiments. Entrepreneurs and investors interact in a game that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard; entrepreneurs may attempt to breach their contracts and expropriate investors. An agent is born into a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931185
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Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 26-43
Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games … experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664597
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Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sébastien - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 47-70
the electorate increases, for any minority size. The numerical advantage of the majority becomes irrelevant: democracy is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117141
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Why votes have value: Instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors
Dittmann, Ingolf; Kübler, Dorothea; Maug, Ernst; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 17-38
interests or direct benefits from voting. The theoretical value of participating in the vote is therefore zero if subjects have … the vote and that they do so for instrumental reasons. The observed voting premium in the main treatment is high and can … model of instrumental voting, which assumes that individuals are overconfident and that they overestimate the errors of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049763
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Political competition between differentiated candidates
Krasa, Stefan; Polborn, Mattias K. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 249-271
We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049805
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Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
Bloch, Francis; van den Nouweland, Anne - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 339-353
rule generating superadditive coalitional games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117136
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Fair by design: Multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
Mu'alem, Ahuva - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 29-46
We address the common scenario where a group of agents wants to divide a set of items fairly, and at the same time seeks to optimize a global goal. Suppose that each item is a task and we want to find an allocation that minimizes the completion time of the last task in an envy-free manner, where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117143
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Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties
Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420
A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192
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Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
Tsakas, Elias - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 126-144
In this paper, we introduce a notion of epistemic equivalence between hierarchies of conditional beliefs and hierarchies of lexicographic beliefs, thus extending the standard equivalence results of Halpern (2010) and Brandenburger et al. (2007) to an interactive setting, and we show that there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785196
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Imperfect memory and choice under risk
Gottlieb, Daniel - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 127-158
This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906700