This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games—the absence of empirical …

player-specific punishments. Using this result, we prove a folk theorem for unequal discounting repeated games that satisfy …

finite or common-prior models — display strategic discontinuity in simple games. …

self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to …

We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using …

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for asymmetric awareness of actions. We extend Pearceʼs (1984 …

Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context …) using repeated games with a unique, albeit significantly different, stage mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Model comparisons …

This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all … games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories … equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for …

analysis of extensive form games. Type spaces are closely related to the sphere models of counterfactual conditionals and to …