We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition...

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have...

Biconcavity is a simple condition on inverse demand that corresponds to the ordinary concept of concavity after simultaneous parameterized transformations of price and quantity. The notion is employed here in the framework of the homogeneous-good Cournot model with potentially heterogeneous...

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only to an agentʼs choice...

The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other playersʼ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyoneʼs actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness,...

Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure....