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Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle

Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 61-76

The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603335

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco; Reuben, Ernesto; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 40-57

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict … altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785206

All-pay war

Hodler, Roland; Yektaş, Hadi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 526-540

We study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models, but because countries lack information about their opponent. In this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049701

Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters

Fujiwara-Greve, Takako; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 504-516

the partnership entered the cooperation phase. We show that such reference letters can be voluntarily provided by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049765

Justifiable punishments in repeated games

Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 16-28

In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117126

An extension of quasi-hyperbolic discounting to continuous time

Pan, Jinrui; Webb, Craig S.; Zank, Horst - In: Games and Economic Behavior 89 (2015) C, pp. 43-55

Two-Stage Exponential (TSE) discounting, the model developed here, generalises exponential discounting in a parsimonious way. It can be seen as an extension of Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting to continuous time. A TSE discounter has a constant rate of time preference before and after some threshold...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190615

Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions

Anbarci, Nejat; Sun, Ching-jen - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 367-376

Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049666

The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game

Cheikbossian, Guillaume - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 68-82

strategies which support cooperation in one group only. These last strategies have the property that cheating on the agreement in … the cooperative group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion … is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049667

On dynamic compromise

Bowen, T. Renee; Zahran, Zaki - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 391-419

Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why donʼt legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are “not too unequal”....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049693

A characterization of a family of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims

Thomson, William - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 157-168

We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, and characterize the family of rules satisfying four standard invariance requirements, homogeneity, two composition properties, and consistency. It takes as point of departure the characterization of the family of two-claimant rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049698