Similar Search Results

Dynamic coordination with individual learning

Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 83-101

We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049831

Hellman, Ziv; Samet, Dov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 2, pp. 517-525

To answer the question in the title we vary agentsʼ beliefs against the background of a fixed knowledge space, that is, a state space with a partition for each agent. Beliefs are the posterior probabilities of agents, which we call type profiles. We then ask what is the topological size of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049847

Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games

Haruvy, Ernan; Stahl, Dale O. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 208-221

Rule learning posits that decision makers, rather than choosing over actions, choose over behavioral rules with …. Past works on rule learning have shown that when playing a single game over a number of rounds, players can learn to form … sophisticated beliefs about others. Here we are interested in learning that occurs between games where the set of actions is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597534

Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures

Xiong, Siyang - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 442-446

Given the regularity condition on posteriors proposed in Lehrer and Samet (2011), we show that Lehrer and Sametʼs (2011) characterization of agreeing to agree in countable-information models cannot be extended to uncountable-information models. This answers an open question raised in Lehrer and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049797

First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: Experimental evidence

Manski, Charles F.; Neri, Claudia - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 232-254

We study first- and second-order subjective expectations (beliefs) in strategic decision-making. We elicit probabilistically both first- and second-order beliefs and apply the method to a Hide-and-Seek experiment. We study the relationship between choice and beliefs in terms of whether observed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738051

Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 678-689

We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus effect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the effect reappears if a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049673

Shaping beliefs in experimental markets for expert services: Guilt aversion and the impact of promises and money-burning options

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 145-164

In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049695

Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

Ambrus, Attila; Lu, Shih En - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 174-189

We show that in multi-sender communication games where senders imperfectly observe the state, if the state space is large enough, then there can exist equilibria arbitrarily close to full revelation of the state as the noise in the senders' observations gets small. In the case of replacement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117135

Learning in society

Camargo, Braz - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 381-396

is the so-called “Rothschild effect.” Many experimentation problems of interest, however, involve learning from both … individual experience and the experience of others. This paper shows that learning in society can overcome the Rothschild effect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049690

Voronoi languages

Jäger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank - In: Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011) 2, pp. 517-537

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703