We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college...

This paper studies the implementation of quotas in matching markets. In a controlled laboratory environment, we compare the performance of two university admissions procedures that both initially reserve a significant fraction of seats at each university for a special subgroup of students. The...

Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal utility is taken into account, Boston interim Pareto dominates DA in certain incomplete information environments with...

We study desirability axioms imposed on allocations in indivisible object allocation problems. The existing axioms in the literature are various conditions of robustness to blocking coalitions with respect to agentsʼ ex ante (individual rationality and group rationality) and ex post (Pareto...

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their...

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider the quality of the matches between patients and...

We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first result shows that there is no group robustly stable...

In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the...

Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure....

We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the...