This paper considers a resource allocation mechanism that utilizes a profit-maximizing auctioneer/matchmaker in the Kelso–Crawford (1982) (many-to-one) assignment problem. We consider general and simple (individualized price) message spaces for firmsʼ reports following Milgrom (2010). We show...

We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This...

It is known that not every symmetric game has a symmetric equilibrium because there are examples of symmetric games that fail to have any equilibria at all. But this leads to the following question: If a symmetric game has a Nash equilibrium, does it have a symmetric Nash equilibrium? In this...

Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We introduce a new cost sharing solution that always selects a point in the core and that is more responsive to...

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidlerʼs (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive...

First via a counter example it is shown that Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

This paper inspires from a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. We introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, teachers can either retain their...