Tijs et al. (2006) introduce the family of obligation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. We prove that obligation rules are closely related with the marginalistic values of the irreducible game. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of obligation rules with two basic...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game, that a social choice function that chooses any particular correlated equilibrium distribution does not...

This paper analyzes the use of a version of lexical maximim strategies, called protective behavior, in two-sided matching models. It restricts attention to mechanisms which produce stable matchings, that is, matchings which are individually rational and pairwise optimal. The main results of the...

We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We...

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to...

This paper analyzes the formation of networks when players choose how much to invest in each relationship. We suppose that players have a fixed endowment that they can allocate across links, and in the baseline model, suppose that link strength is an additively separable and convex function of...