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Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 247-270

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of … general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049754

Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions

Zheng, Charles Z. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 2, pp. 648-664

A model of English auctions is proposed to incorporate the possibility of jump bidding. When two objects are sold separately via such auctions, bidders signal their willingness to pay via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the prices without relying on any central mediator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588270

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 192-204

payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719485

Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man?

Chen, Yan; Katuščák, Peter; Ozdenoren, Emre - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 181-213

men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second …-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049904

Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study

Brunner, Christoph; Hu, Audrey; Oechssler, Jörg - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 467-484

English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049760

From Custer to Thermopylae: Last stand behavior in multi-stage contests

Gelder, Alan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 442-466

In a multi-stage contest known as a two-player race, players display two fundamental behaviors: (1) the laggard will make a last stand in order to avoid the cost of losing; and (2) the player who is ahead will defend his lead if it is threatened. Last stand behavior, in particular, contrasts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931187

Games played through agents in the laboratory — a test of Prat & Rustichini's model

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Huck, Steffen; Leutgeb, Johannes - In: Games and Economic Behavior 119 (2020), pp. 30-55

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people (“agents”) make decisions that affect the payoffs of others (“principals”) who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012221614

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 367-391

loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise … of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when … lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191

Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties

Weerdt, Mathijs M. de; Harrenstein, Paul; Conitzer, Vincent - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 405-420

A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms …, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785192