Showing 1 - 10 of 232
Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785191
We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049683
We analyze an environment in which biddersʼ private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049751
-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the “entrant” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality …. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049770
I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049799
We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess two-dimensional private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662458
Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each otherʼs bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049811
In an individual experimentation problem a decision maker learns only from his own experience. It is well known that an optimal experimentation strategy for such problems sometimes results in the best alternative being dropped altogether, which is the so-called “Rothschild effect.” Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049690
We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049703
We experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary N-player entry games with strategic complementarities. In static entry games, we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010664595