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Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These … three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and … these solutionsʼ bargaining theories. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049666
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … players bargain about the division of a shrinking surplus under a standard bargaining protocol in discrete time with constant … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
characterized by a minmax problem involving efficient equilibrium payoffs that are above the bargaining frontier, which is possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049845
A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie …. Higher cost functions are shown to improve bargaining power. The limit equilibrium prediction of the model, as the cost … Bargaining Solution of Kalai (1977). …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846
bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
We analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller. Potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. The seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game, which is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753433
We study whether allowing players to sign binding contracts governing future play leads to reputation effects in repeated games with long-run players. We proceed by extending the analysis of Abreu and Pearce (2007) by allowing for the possibility that different behavioral types may not be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573642
I study a bilateral bargaining game in which the size of the surplus follows a stochastic process and in which players … might be optimistic about their bargaining power. Following Yildiz (2003), I model optimism by assuming that players have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603332
endogenously from behaviour. We apply each case to Rubinstein's infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining model. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190615