A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have “yes” or “no” inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes...

In the literature various axiomatizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf value can be found where the only difference is the Shapley value satisfying efficiency and the Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality. Both properties seem to be desirable. In this paper, we show that there is no...

This paper proposes axiomatic foundations of expectation formation rules, by which deviating players anticipate the reaction of external players in a partition function game. The projection rule is the only rule satisfying subset consistency and responsiveness to the original partition of...

This paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if...

We investigate an extension of the notion of backward induction to dynamic games with imperfect information and provide a doxastic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2014), who also provided a doxastic...

We study the problem of allocating m identical items among nm agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be...

We propose a dynamic framework where the rationality of a playerʼs choice is judged on the basis of the actual beliefs that he has at the time he makes that choice. The set of “possible worlds” is given by state-instant pairs (ω,t), where each state specifies the entire play of the game....

We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and by specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If,...

We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the other player's. In order to find a solution of reasonable quality, some amount of communication is required. We study algorithms where the...